Credit allocation, capital requirements and output by Jokivuolle, Esa et al.
Esa Jokivuolle – Ilkka Kiema – Timo Vesala
Credit allocation, capital
requirements and output
Bank of Finland Research
Discussion Papers
















































Bank of Finland 
PO Box 160 
FI-00101 HELSINKI 
Finland 






Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 
17 • 2010 
   Esa Jokivuolle* – Ilkka Kiema** – Timo Vesala*** 
   Credit allocation, capital 
requirements and output 
    The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland. 
 
*  Corresponding author. E-mail: esa.jokivuolle@bof.fi. 
**  University of Helsinki, Finland. E-mail: 
ilkka.kiema@helsinki.fi. 
***  Danske Bank A/S, Finland. E-mail: 
timo.vesala@danskebank.com 
 
We would like to thank the following for their valuable 
comments Iftekhar Hasan, Rocco Huang, Bob Hunt, Timo 
Korkeamäki, Yrjö Koskinen, Loretta Mester, Alistair Milne, 
Henri Pages, George Pennacchi, Jean-Charles Rochet, Tuomas 
Takalo, Jouko Vilmunen, and colleagues at the Bank of Finland 
workshops as well as paticipants of the Bank of Finland – 
Journal of Financial Stability conference in June 2007, Cass 
Business School Banking Center conference in May 2008, 
Euroframe conference in June 2009, CEPR/ESI 2009, Bank of 
Sweden conference in Nov 2009, Deutche Bundesbank and 
Technische Universität Dresden workshop in Oct 2010 and 
seminars at the Banque de France, the ECB, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Goethe University, the Helsinki 
School of Economics and Hanken, University of 
Helsinki/RUESG and University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. This version updates the Bank of Finland 
Discussion Paper 23/2009, ‘Credit Allocation, Capital 






















































Credit allocation, capital requirements and output 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 17/2010 
Esa Jokivuolle – Ilkka Kiema – Timo Vesala 




We show how banks’ excessive risk-taking, stemming from informational 
asymmetries in loan markets, can lead to an excessive output loss when a 
recession starts. Risk-based capital requirements can alleviate the output loss by 
reducing excessive risk-taking in ‘normal’ times. Model simulations suggest that 
the differentiation of risk-weights in the Basel framework might be further 
increased in order to take full advantage of the allocational effects of capital 
requirements. Our analysis also provides a new rationale for the countercyclical 
elements of capital requirements. 
 
Keywords: bank regulation, Basel III, capital requirements, credit risk, crises, 
procyclicality 
 
JEL classification numbers: D41, D82, G14, G21, G28 
  
4 
Luottojen kohdentuminen, vakavaraisuusvaatimukset 
ja tuotanto 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 17/2010 
Esa Jokivuolle – Ilkka Kiema – Timo Vesala 




Pankkien liiallinen riskinotto, joka kumpuaa luottomarkkinoiden informaatio-
ongelmista, voi syventää tuotannon supistumista taantumassa. Koska riskiperus-
teiset pääomavaatimukset vähentävät liiallista riskinottoa ”normaaliaikoina”, ne 
voivat lieventää tuotannon supistumista. Simulaatiot tässä tutkimuksessa 
kehittämällämme mallilla viittaavat siihen, että Baselin vakavaraisuuskehikon 
riskipainoja voitaisiin eriyttää toisistaan vielä lisää, jotta riskiperusteisista 
pääomavaatimuksista saataisiin täysi hyöty. Tutkimus tarjoaa myös uuden selityk-
sen siihen, miksi pääomavaatimusten vastasykliset elementit ovat hyödyllisiä. 
 
Avainsanat: pankkien sääntely, Basel III, pääomavaatimukset, luottoriski, kriisit, 
vastasyklisyys 
 
JEL-luokittelu: D41, D82, G14, G21, G28  
5 
Contents 
Abstract .................................................................................................................... 3 
Tiivistelmä (abstract in Finnish) .............................................................................. 4 
 
1 Introduction  ......................................................................................................  7 
 
2 The  model  ..........................................................................................................  9 
  2.1  State of the economy ............................................................................... 11 
 2.2  Entrepreneurs  ...........................................................................................  11 
 2.3  Banks  .......................................................................................................  14 
 2.4  Equilibria  .................................................................................................  16 
 
3  Credit allocation and capital requirements ................................................. 17 
  3.1  The output-maximizing (first-best) allocation  ......................................... 17 
  3.2  Constant capital requirements ................................................................. 18 
 3.3  Risk-based  capital  requirements  ..............................................................  19 
 
4 Simulation  results  ...........................................................................................  21 
 4.1  Calibration  ...............................................................................................  22 
 4.2  Constant  vs  risk-based capital requirements ........................................... 25 
  4.3  Modified risk-based capital requirements ............................................... 28 
 
5 Conclusions  .....................................................................................................  31 
 
References .............................................................................................................. 32 
  
6 1 Introduction
The global ﬁnancial crisis has led to an overhaul of banks’ international capital
standards, known as Basel III. The quality and level of capital requirements has
been increased and countercyclical elements have been added. Inconsistencies
in the risk-weighting of asset classes have been corrected for, notably in banks’
trading book. Generally, however, the risk-weighting system has not been
changed (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010).
The motivation to add countercyclical elements to capital requirements
largely stems from the concern that risk-sensitive capital requirements,
introduced in the Basel II reform (see Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 2006), may have contributed to reduced credit supply in the crisis.
This is referred to as the procyclicality of capital requirements.1
In addition to the procyclical eﬀect of capital requirements after a recession
has started, it is commonly understood that problems in the allocation of credit
in the years preceding the global ﬁnancial crisis were a key factor leading to the
crisis and contributing to the severity of the crisis.2 A part of the rationale for
increasing the level of capital requirements in Basel III, particularly the buﬀer
intended to be linked to the aggregate country-speciﬁcc r e d i tg r o w t h ,c a nb e
understood to address this concern: higher capital requirements in booms
would help contain excessive lending growth which could be accumulating too
many risks.
In this paper we study the role of capital requirements in containing
excessively risky investments and hence alleviating the potential consequences
of such risks in a recession. Excessively risky investments could contribute
to the severity of an economic dowturn if one occured. First, we present a
new mechanism, stemming from informational asymmetries in the market for
bank loans, which ampliﬁes the drop of output in a recession. We show in the
standard model of DeMeza and Webb (1987), cast in a simple dynamic setting
with a normal and a recessionary macro state, that relative to the ﬁrst-best
economy output drops excessively when a recession hits. This is because, as
DeMeza and Webb (1987) have shown, in the presence of informational credit
market frictions too many productive resources are allocated to high-risk
projects in normal times. They materialize as an excessive loss of output
if a recession hits. The key additional assumption we make in this setting,
supported by casual empirical evidence, is that the failure rate of high-risk
1The mechanism works as follows. Banks’ capital requirements may become binding
in recessions as losses occur and risk-sensitive capital requirements increase as a result of
increasing risk measures. Consequently, banks may have to cut back lending as in a recession
new external capital is hard to come by. As a result, economic activity may be further
dampened. See eg Kashyap and Stein (2004), Pennacchi (2005), Gordy and Howells (2006),
and Repullo and Suarez (2009).
2Numerous studies provide an account of the developments preceding the crisis; see eg
Acharya et al (2010).
7investment projects increases more in economic downturns than the failure
rate of low-risk projects.34
Second, we show that risk-sensitive capital requirements, based on the
observable risk properties of investment projects, can help alleviate the
excessive output drop. This results from the eﬀect that risk-sensitive capital
requirements can reduce the excessive allocation in high-risk projects. This is
because risk-sensitive capital requirements, unlike risk-insensitive requirements
(like those in Basel I), provide a suﬃcient number of instruments to inﬂuence
the relative prices of high-risk and low-risk loans and hence their allocation.
The allocational eﬀect of capital requirements works via the premium on banks’
cost of equity capital, which makes equity the most costly form of ﬁnance from
banks’ perspective (for the cost of bank equity, see eg Repullo and Suarez
(2009) and the literature cited therein).
At the core of our approach is the market failure which results from
informational asymmetries in the credit market. Numerical simulations with
the model shed light on the relationship between the size of this market failure
and the properties of risk-sensitive capital requirements. Several important
results are obtained.
First, risk-sensitive capital requirements which mimick the real capital
requirements are able to eliminate a considerable part of the market
failure. Second, correcting for the allocational distortion is a novel role for
risk-sensitive capital requirements which is not accounted for in the current
Basel risk-weights. Hence it is quite possible, as our simulations indicate, that
the relative diﬀerentiation between asset risks should be larger than the one
provided by the current Basel risk-weights. Third, the size of the market failure
is likely to decrease in a recession, so capital requirements should be lowered
when new investment decisions are made in a recession state. This provides
a new rationale for adding countercyclical elements to capital requirements.
Our simulations indicate, however, that adjusting capital requirements to the
business cycle may have a relatively small beneﬁt in correcting for the allocative
distortions.
In order to keep the model simple and to focus on the allocational eﬀects of
risk-sensitive vs risk-insensitive capital requirements, we have abstracted from
explicitly modeling the social costs and beneﬁts of capital requirements which
3CDS spreads for investment-grade and non-investment-grade corporates before and
during the global ﬁnancial crisis provide evidence that the default risk of high-risk
investments increases more in economic downturns. Further evidence is also provided by
default statistics per rating class; see Nickell et al (2000).
4In modeling banks’ excessive risk taking, the DeMeza and Webb (1987) framework
provides a starting point to our analysis in that it exhibits the overinvestment in high-risk
projects which in our dynamic setting is shown to lead to the excessive output drop in a
recession. The often cited alternative model of credit markets, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
exhibits credit rationing which would apparently have diﬀerent implications in a dynamic
setting like ours. However, unlike in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), debt is the optimal ﬁnancing
contract in the DeMeza and Webb framework. Hence, it should be more likely that the type
of circumstances analysed in DeMeza and Webb (1987) prevail in the bank loan market.
Yet, it is ultimately an empirical question, which of the two frameworks provides a better
description of credit markets in general. Our only aim here is to build our analysis on
theoretical premises which capture banks’ potentially excessive risk-taking, something which
the repeated crises indicate credit markets suﬀer at least from time to time.
8relate to securing banks’ solvency (for a similar modeling strategy; see Repullo
and Suarez, 2009). Hence, in comparing risk-sensitive and risk-insensitive
capital requirement regimes, we take as given the average level of capital
requirements over time and across diﬀerent regimes, considering only the
allocation of the total capital requirement across the project risk types and
the macro states. Accordingly, we do not make any direct statements about
the preferable average level of capital requirements. Nonetheless, analysis of
the ﬁrst-best allocation of the model economy indicates that the level of capital
requirements may also have a signiﬁcant impact on the resource allocation.5
In line with DeMeza and Webb (1987), we show that risk-based taxes on
banks’ interest income, assuming that such taxes are a socially cost-neutral
instrument, could be used to top up capital requirements to further improve
allocation and even to achieve the ﬁrst-best. This might provide a new angle
to the debate on introducing taxes on banks.
The paper which is perhaps closest related to ours is Boissay and
Kok-Sørensen (2009) who conclude that a favorable allocational eﬀect of
risk-sensitive capital requirements may attenuate procyclicality. Other papers
have focused on allocational eﬀects of capital requirements from perspectives
which diﬀer from ours (see eg Rochet, 1992; Thakor, 1996; Repullo, 2004; and
Repullo and Suarez, 2004). A number of studies have focused on procyclicality
(eg Gordy and Howells, 2006; Heid, 2007; Pennacchi, 2005; Repullo and Suarez,
2009; Repullo et al, 2009; Zhu, 2008; and Zicchino, 2006). Chiesa (2001) and
Kashyap and Stein (2004) endogenously derive capital requirements which
should be lowered in recessions, but the underlying mechanisms diﬀer from
the one presented by us. Recent papers on bank risk-taking from diﬀerent
angles are provided, eg by Acharya and Naqvi (2010) and Agur and Demertzis
(2010).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
formal model which is then used in Section 3 to study the eﬀects of capital
requirements on the allocation of credit and to study the ﬁrst-best allocation.
Section 4 presents simulation results with various capital requirement regimes.
Section 5 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
Our model is concerned with the allocation of resources in the credit market
under diﬀerent capital requirement regimes. Below we explain the central
features of the model before starting its formal analysis in subsection 2.1.
There are long-lived entrepreneurs who can in each period invest in a
high-risk or a low-risk project. Each project is fully ﬁnanced by a bank loan.
Alternatively, entrepreneurs can take a ﬁxed outside option; ie go to the labor
market. The investment projects last one period. Intrinsic ‘types’ of the
entrepreneurs determine their success probabilities in the investment projects,
whereas the payoﬀ in the labor market is independent of the intrinsic type.
5It would be a natural extension to the current analysis to model the allocational eﬀects
of higher capital requirements such as those introduced in Basel III.
9The economy has two possible macro states, ‘normal’ and ‘recession’, which
vary in accordance with a Markov process. The macro state in the period in
which the project gets ﬁnished aﬀects the project’s success probability, but
this state is not known when the project is chosen. When an entrepreneur
makes a choice between the projects and the outside option, she knows only
the current macro state of the economy.
Success probabilities decline in recessions, and the success probabilities
of high-risk projects decline more than those of low-risk projects. If a project
fails, the entrepreneur can start again with a new project or choose the outside
option in the next period. Failed projects produce a smaller output than the
successful ones.
In any single period, eﬃcient resource allocation is obtained if the
entrepreneurs with the highest types invest in high-risk projects, which also
oﬀer the best payoﬀ when successful. Entrepreneurs at the bottom of
the type distribution should not invest at all but hold to the safe outside
option. Entrepreneurs located in the middle of the type distribution should
invest in low-risk projects. In equilibrium, the investment choices of the
entrepreneurs are indicated by two unique thresholds in the type distribution
of the entrepreneurs.
Banks operate in competitive credit markets and they cannot observe
the types and hence the success probabilities of the individual entrepreneurs.
However, banks have rational expectations concerning the equilibrium average
success probabilities of entrepreneurs investing in each investment project type.
Competitive loan prices govern the project or outside option choices of the
entrepreneurs.
The role of capital adequacy regulation of banks in the model is two-fold.
First, minimum capital requirements are in place in order to prevent banks’
failure and hence to avoid the social costs of such failures. Second, as we show,
capital requirements may help correct for distortions in resource allocation,
inherent in the credit market. In order to focus on the second aspect, and
its implications for output dynamics in recessions, we simplify the model by
calibrating the model parameters in such a manner that minimum capital
requirements — regardless of their type — always suﬃce to prevent banks’ failure.
This simpliﬁcation has two important implications. First, because banks
never fail, they are able to ﬁnance themselves with riskless deposits. Second,
the standard mechanisms which may cause procyclicality of lending are not at
work: i) bank failures do not cause any potential disruptions in lending, and
ii) banks have no need to reduce lending or reserve a precautionary capital
buﬀer on top of the minimum requirement in order to reduce the likelihood
of their failure (see Repullo and Suarez, 2009, for a model in which banks do
have such incentives). Indeed, under competitive loan prices banks will always
choose the minimum amount of capital allowed by the capital requirements.
By assumption this capital will be available to the banks at a ﬁxed price.
According to a conventional result, which is valid in settings of this type,
there is too much risk-taking because higher-type borrowers cross-subsidize
lower-type borrowers through the price system which is based on average
success rates (De Meza and Webb, 1987). The risk-taking incentive ultimately
stems from the leverage eﬀect of debt ﬁnance. We show that risk-insensitive
10(constant, henceforth) capital requirements maintain this overinvestment
equilibrium (Proposition 1 below). In contrast, risk-sensitive (risk-based,
henceforth) capital requirements alleviate the cross-subsidization eﬀect and
hence reduce overinvestment in high-risk projects.6 Simulations with the
calibrated model in Section 4 demonstrate the beneﬁcial eﬀect of this on the
output dynamics if a recession hits.
2.1 State of the economy
The model is in discrete time with periods  =0 12 and the state of the
economy is in each period either  (normal) or  (recession). During each
period , the probability that the economy is during the next period  +1in
the state  ´(where  ´∈ {}) is determined by its state  ( ∈ {})
i nt h ec u r r e n tp e r i o d .T h i sp r o b a b i l i t yw i l lb e l o wb ed e n o t e db y ´ ,a n di t
will be assumed that    and   , so that the fact that the
economy is in a state  in a given period makes it more likely that it is in the
same state also in the following period.
2.2 Entrepreneurs
The economy is constituted by a continuum of entrepreneurs, indexed by .
The distribution of the parameter  is given by a positive density function ()
on [01]. During each period , each entrepreneur can choose a high-risk (H)
project or a low-risk (L) project, or a riskless outside option. Both high-risk
and low-risk projects require investments, which must be ﬁnanced by a bank.
The entrepreneur must make a choice between these three options and the
bank must make its ﬁnancing decisions at the end of the previous period −1
before the state of the economy in period  is known.
The riskless outside option produces the payoﬀ 0.T h e v a l u e  is,
for simplicity, assumed to be independent of the type of the entrepreneur and
the state of the economy. Each project either succeeds or fails. The success
probability of a project depends on 1) the type  ∈ {} of the project,
2) the state  ∈ {} of the economy when the project is realized, and 3)
the type  of the enterpreneneur. The functions e  () express the success
probability of a project as a function of  for each combination of the state 
of the economy in the period in which the project is realized, and the type 
of the project. It is assumed that a high-risk project has a smaller chance of
6Risk-based capital requirements are diﬀerentiated between high-risk and low-risk
projects. Because in our model banks do not observe the competence of the entrepreneurs,
banks’ internal ratings (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006) must be based
on the project type only. Accordingly, we postulate that banks calculate the expected default
probabilities for the projects of each type, and use them for determining capital requirements
for the respective loans.
11success than a low-risk project, ie that for each both when  =  and when
 = 
0 ≤ e  () ≤ e () (2.1)
The type  of an entrepreneur can be interpreted as a representation of her
entrepreneurial competence. It is assumed that competence increases the
probability of success of a project, ie that
e  ´() ≥ 0 (  = )( 2 . 2 )
We further assume that the probability of success of a project of type  is
reduced by a constant factor in a recession, so that
e  ()=e e () (2.3)
where the constants e  and e  are speciﬁcf o rt h ep r o j e c tt y p e sa n d1  e 
 e . In other words, we assume that the success of the high-risk project is
more sensitive to the state of the economy than the success of the low-risk
project. Below it will be seen that this plausible assumption is quite crucial
for our analysis of output dynamics.7
When the project is launched, an entrepreneur of type  does not yet know
t h es t a t eo ft h ee c o n o m yi nt h en e x tp e r i o di nw h i c ht h ep r o j e c ti sr e a l i z e d .
H e n c e ,i ft h ec u r r e n ts t a t ei s, the success probability of a new project of type
 for the entrepreneur of type  is
 ()=e ()+e  () (2.4)
Combining (23) and (24), this probability may be expressed in the form
 ()=e () (2.5)
where
 =  +e  (2.6)
The results (23) and (24) imply that the analogies of (21)—(22) stay valid
also when the probabilities e  () (ie, the success probabilities of the projects
in the period in which they get realized) are replaced by the probabilities
7See references to the empirical evidence in footnote 3 above. Moreover, the assumption
that e   e , ie that the success probabilities of the high-risk projects decline in recessions
more than the success probabilities of the low-risk projects can be given a few interpretations.
High-risk projects could be thought of as investments into new products to be introduced
to the market. Such investments often take place in economic upturns but might easily
turn unproﬁtable if the aggregate demand starts to decline. Low-risk projects in turn,
representing perhaps investments in already existing products, would be less sensitive to
overall demand ﬂuctuations. More generally, almost by deﬁnition the ‘beta’ (in the meaning
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model) of a high-risk project is high, indicating high exposure
to market wide factors, often strongly correlated with the business cycle.
12 () (ie, the success probabilities of the projects in the period in which they
are launched).
We assume that a low-risk project produces  if it succeeds, that a
high-risk project produces  if it succeeds, and that
   (2.7)
We restrict attention to the economically plausible equilibria in which in each
period  t h el e a s tc o m p e t e n ta g e n t s( t h ea g e n t si ns o m ei n t e r v a l[0))c h o o s e
the outside option, the most competent agents (the agents in some interval ¡¯ 1
¤
) choose the high-risk project, and there are also some agents in between
who choose the low-risk project (ie,   ¯  and all agents in the interval £
¯ 
¤
choose the low-risk project). Suppose now that the cut-oﬀ values which
correspond to the projects that have been chosen at the end of some period
 − 1 are  and ¯  and that the state of the economy in period  − 1 is .
As it will be explained in a more detailed manner in the next subsection,
banks can make loan repayments of the successful entrepreneurs conditional
on the type  of their projects but not on the entrepreneurial competence
parameter . Accordingly, if  denotes the payment that the bank receives
from a succesful entrepreneur with a project of type , then the expected proﬁt





 ()=()( − ) (2.8)




 ()= ()( − ) (2.9)
By assumption, when choosing between projects at the end of period  − 1
each entrepreneur is maximizing her expected proﬁti np e r i o d. Accordingly,
in equilibrium the cut-oﬀ value  is the value for which the expected proﬁt
from a low-risk project is identical with the value of the outside option; ie, it
satisﬁes the condition
()( − )= (2.10)
Similarly, the cut-oﬀ value ¯  is the value for which the expected proﬁtf r o ma







( − ) (2.11)
It turns out that the equations (210) and (211) are solved by a unique
combination of cut-oﬀ values  and ¯  when the parameters of the model are
given the empirically plausible speciﬁcations which we consider.
132.3 Banks
T h es i z eo ft h ei n v e s t m e n tw h i c ha ne n t r e p r e n e u rm u s tm a k ei no r d e rt o
implement a new project will be denoted by . The entrepreneurs can obtain
the needed external funding  from credit markets in which competitive banks
deliver standard debt contracts. DeMeza and Webb (1987) have shown that
debt is the optimal ﬁnancing contract in the current type of setting. When a
bank makes its ﬁnancing decision, it can by assumption observe the current
state  of the economy and the type  of the project, but it cannot observe the
type of the entrepreneur  and it also does not know the state of the economy
in the next period.
If a bank invested  units of ﬁnancial capital elsewhere in the ﬁnancial
markets, it could by assumption risklessly earn ¯ . We normalize the riskless
interest rate to zero, so that ¯  = . ¯  also represents the bank’s own cost
of ﬁnancing a project with riskless deposits. This follows from assuming that
deposits are fully insured and, in line with Repullo and Suarez (2009), that the
insurance premium is zero. The zero premium is justiﬁed because — as it will
shortly be explained in more detail — we consider only capital requirements
that suﬃce to cover the losses that ﬁnancing the projects of our entrepreners
might cause.
We postulate that a bank can raise arbitrary amounts of deposits at the
zero rate. However, an excess return of 0 is required for each unit of
equity capital.8 Since neither the social planner nor banks can observe the
competence parameter values  o ft h ei n d i v i d u a le n t r e p r e n e u r s ,a tm o s tt w o
diﬀerent capital requirements can be in use in any single period. In general,
the capital requirements state that a part  of the loans of type  ( ∈ {})
that are given must be funded by equity, and only a part 1− may be funded
by deposits.9 Together the costs that the bank incurs from ﬁnancing a project
total
(1 − ) ¯  +  (1 + ) ¯  =( 1+) ¯ 
Below we shall also consider the possibility that the regulator introduced taxes
on banks’ investments in order to correct for allocative distortions in the credit
market. More speciﬁcally, we consider a tax  ¯  (where  ≥ 0 is a constant)
which is proportional to the size of the investment ¯ . When the costs of the
tax are included, the total costs of ﬁnancing a project of type  turn out to be
(1 + ) ¯ 
where the multiplier  is given by
 =  +  (2.12)
8See Repullo and Suarez (2009) and the studies cited therein for why equity, in addition
to the reasons given in the corporate ﬁnance literature, is a relatively costly form of ﬁnance,
in particular to banks.
9In the current context banks never have an incentive to hold equity capital in excess of
the minimum amount required by the regulator. In reality, banks typically hold more capital
than the minimum requirement. However,as Repullo and Suarez (2009) argue, this may
result from the desire to hold buﬀer capital to avoid breaching the minimum requirement,
in which case the amount of bank capital is still linked to the minimum requirement.
14For simplicity, in what follows we assume, unless stated otherwise, that taxes
a r ez e r os ot h a tt h ee x t r ac o s t sf o rb a n k sr e s u l ts o l e l yf r o mt h ec a p i t a l
requirement.
As it was explained above, a project of type  produces  if it succeeds,
and in this case the bank receives the sum  in return for its investment. If
a project is unsuccesful, the entrepreneur defaults. The parameter  expresses
the loss given default of the bank, so that in case of default the bank receives
only ¯  −  ¯  =( 1− ) ¯  in return for its investment. The loss given default
 is postulated to be independent of the competence of the entrepreneur, an
assumption which is natural when (1 − ) ¯  is, for example, the resale value
of the capital that the entrepreneur has bought.
From the perspective of the bank, the success probability of a project of
type  is given by the average success probability of projects of that type
because the bank cannot observe the  values of individual entrepreneurs. In
general, the average success probability of entrepreneurs in the interval [1 2]












when 1  2, and trivially,  ()= (). In particular, the success
probability of a low-risk project, when the ﬁnanciation decision is made, is
given by





and similarly, the success probabilty of a high-risk project is given by




These probabilities diﬀer from the share of the projects that actually succeed.
The success rate  ´  of newly started low-risk projects, given that the state
o ft h ee c o n o m yi nt h en e x tp e r i o di s ´ , is the average value of e  ´ () (and
not of ())i nt h ei n t e r v a l[1 2], and the success rate  ´  of newly started
high-risk projects, given that the state of the economy in the next period is  ´ ,
is the average value of e  ´  () (and not of  ())i nt h ei n t e r v a l[21] We
can now conclude from (23) and (26) that the succes rates  ´  and  ´  and
the probabilities ˆ  and ˆ  are related by




The amount of deposits that a bank has per loan of type  is (1 − ) ¯ .T h e
share  ´  of these loans do not default, and for these loans the bank receives
the repayment , but for the defaulted loans it receives only (1 − ) ¯ . Hence,
the bank does not default if and only if
15 ´  +( 1−  ´ )(1− ) ¯  ≥ (1 − ) ¯  (2.17)
As our aim is to focus on the allocational eﬀects of capital requirements rather
than their role in securing banks’ solvency, we assume in what follows that
condition (217) is valid.10 Whenever this is the case, the repayment  for a
successful project of type  must satisfy the condition
b  +
¡
1 − b 
¢
(1 − ) ¯  =( 1+) ¯ 









The no default condition (217) can now be simpliﬁed by inserting the value of
 into it and using (216). The resulting condition is stronger in a recession,








We still reformulate the equilibrium conditions of the model using the
expressions of  and  that we have just found. In (22) above we allowed
for the possibility that the success probability of entrepreneurs  might stay
constant in some region, and we now introduce the additional assumption






 ˆ    (1) (2.20)
in order to ensure that the success probabilities of low-risk entrepreneurs and
high-risk entrepreneurs vary in the equilibria that we consider.
When the values of the capital requirements  and  have been ﬁxed,























10This decision is also motivated by the fact that in the calibrated version of our model
the capital requirements which suﬃce for making the condition (217) valid turn out to be
quite small. Cf. footnote 17 below.
16is the expected proﬁt of the entrepreneur  from a low-risk project, assuming
that the cut-oﬀ values are  and ¯ . On the other hand, the expected proﬁto f





































Hence, a given upper cut-oﬀ value ¯  corresponds to an equilibrium of the model









which states that (211) is valid when the repayments have their equilibrium
values (218).
3 Credit allocation and capital requirements
3.1 The output-maximizing (ﬁrst-best) allocation
We measure the size of the allocative distortions in the economy by the loss
of output that they cause. The output of the successful entrepreneurs  is
measured with their proﬁts and the output of the entrepreneurs who choose
the outside option with their wage . The output of an entrepreneur who fails
is negative, and it is equal with the loss given default of the bank. Accordingly,
the expected output of an entrepreneur  who chooses a project of type  when
the state of the economy is  is
 ()= ()
¡
 − ¯ 
¢
− (1 −  ()) ¯ 
=  ()
¡
 − (1 − ) ¯ 
¢
−  ¯  (3.1)
Hence, when the cut-oﬀ values are  and ¯ , the expected aggregate output of
the entrepreneurs is given by11







11Note that competitive banks make zero expected proﬁts.
17When the lower cut-oﬀ  obtains its output-maxizing value  = 
,t h eo u t p u t
gain from the outside option is for the cut-oﬀ entrepreneur  equal to the
expected output gain from the low-risk project. Hence, the optimal lower
cut-oﬀ value 




 − (1 − ) ¯ 
¢
−  ¯  =  (3.3)
On the other hand, when the upper cut-oﬀ ¯  obtains its output-maximizing
value ¯ 
, the expected output gains  and  from the low-risk and the
high-risk project must be equal for the upper cut-oﬀ entrepreneur ¯ .T h e









 − (1 − ) ¯ 
¢
(3.4)
3.2 Constant capital requirements
Having constructed the benchmark allocation which maximizes the expected
output, we now proceed to analyzing the credit allocation eﬀects of constant
capital requirements (this subsection) and risk-based capital requirements (the
next subsection). A constant capital requirement  has the same value for both
kinds of projects and in both states of the economy, so that  =  = .I n
our framework a constant capital requirement corresponds to the case in which
(221) and (225) are valid with  =  = . When the resulting cut-oﬀsa r e
denoted by 
 and ¯ 




























⎠( + ) ¯  (3.5)
Ac o m p a r i s o no f(35) and (31) shows that the left-hand side of (35) expresses
the diﬀerence in the expected output when the entrepreneur ¯ 
 chooses a
high-risk project and when she chooses a low-risk project. The assumption
(220) easily implies that the right-hand side of (35) is always negative and
hence, under constant capital requirements some of the entrepreneurs who
choose a high-risk project would have a larger expected output if they chose a
low-risk project. This result can be formulated as the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 Under a constant capital requirement regime, there is
overinvestment in high-risk projects as entrepreneurs with ineﬃciently low





This result exempliﬁes the DeMeza and Webb (1987) overinvestment result
which stems from the fact that the more competent entrepreneurs who invest
18in high-risk projects cross-subsidize the less competent ones who invest in
similar projects, since the interest rates reﬂect average success rates. The
equation (35) shows that the overinvestment problem exists for all legitimate
values of . The overinvestment mechanism is based on the positive level of the
altervative cost ¯  which causes a limited liability eﬀect on the entrepreneurs
and spurs risk-taking. Indeed, note from equation (35) that if ¯  was zero, the
optimal equilibrium would obtain.
There is no analogous reason why the lower cut-oﬀ could not have
its output-maximizing value 
 under a constant capital requirement.
The cross-subsidation eﬀect tends to increase also the number of low-risk
enterpreneurs, lowering the value of  below its optimal level, but this
eﬀect can be compensated for by raising the capital requirement. The
following remark, which follows easily from (221), (222) and (33), speciﬁes
a condition for the constant capital requirement  which guarantees that the
two eﬀects cancel each other out so that the lower cut-oﬀ value 
 obtains
its output-maximizing value 
.
Remark 3.2 The lower cut-oﬀ value 
 obtains its output-maximizing value




() − 1) ≡ 
Since  does not aﬀect the payoﬀ from the outside option ,i tc a nb eu s e d
to limit market participation. The capital requirement reduces the incentive
to invest and thus alleviates the excess market entry which results from the
cross-subsidization eﬀect. The value  is the capital requirement which
implements the output-maximizing allocation. Note that the result that a
constant capital requirement can be used to reduce excessive market entry
(which is equivalent with total lending in the current context) is consistent
with the reasoning which was given when Basel I rules were introduced in
1988. That time it was seen that increased international banking competition
was leading to swelling bank balance sheets and eroding capital bases (see also
Furﬁne (2001)).
3.3 Risk-based capital requirements
Next we consider risk-based capital requirements. In our model risk is
measured by the failure probability of a project. This is consistent with the
Basel framework in which capital requirements are based on the internal
customer ratings of a bank and the average probability of default assigned
to each rating. Accordingly, we deﬁne the values  (where  = )a s
functions  = (ˆ ) of the probability of success ˆ  that the bank perceives
the projects to have in the next period. Under a risk-based capital requirement
regime the values  and  will be diﬀerent. The equilibria that the model
has in this case have already been characterized in subsection 2.4: they are












when the functions 
and  are given by (224) and (223), respectively.
When the values  and  are set separately, the regulator has as
many independent instruments which aﬀect allocational eﬃciency as there are
diﬀerent loan categories. This has the consequence that unlike in the constant
requirement regime the regulator can produce any chosen values for the cut-oﬀs




. We shall illustrate this point
by presenting explicit formulas for the values of  and  which maximize the
expected output.
Using the notations b  =  
¡¯ 1
¢





equilibrium conditions (221) and (225) can be expressed in the following form
()
¡
 − (1 − ) ¯ 
¢
−  ¯  −  =
()
b 





















( + ) ¯  (3.7)
The conditions (33) and (34) imply that the left-hand sides of equations (36)
and (37) are zero when the cut-oﬀs  and ¯  obtain their output-maximizing
values  = 
 and ¯  = ¯ 
. This allows one to explicitly solve the
output-maximizing capital requirements as functions of the output-maximizing
cut-oﬀs
Remark 3.3 The capital requirements  and  yield the optimal cut-oﬀs
 = 
 and  = 

if and only if  = ∗
 and  = ∗
























Even when one restricts attention to lower values of  and , one can observe
that the number of high-risk projects is excessive if the left-hand side of (37)
is negative. This is because the left-hand side of (37) expresses the output
diﬀerence in the case in which the cut-oﬀ entrepreneur chooses a high-risk
project and the case in which she chooses a low-risk project. In this case the
number of high-risk entrepreneurs can be reduced by increasing the value of the
left-hand side of (37),w h i c h(37) suggests will happen if  is lowered or  is
increased, ie if the capital requirements for low-risk and high-risk projects are
further diﬀerentiated. It should be observed that this intuitive argument does
not suﬃce to prove rigorously that a risk-based capital requirement regime
would always decrease excessive high-risk investments in comparison with a
ﬂat-rate regime,12 but the argument turns out to be valid for the economically
relevant parameter speciﬁcations that we use in our simulations.
12This argument is not valid in general, because changes in  and  aﬀect also b  and
b . For the economically relevant speciﬁcations of the model, such indirect eﬀects are small
in comparison with the direct eﬀects of changing  and , but they are not small for all
possible choices of the density function  and the probabilities e .
204 Simulation results
Above we saw that in our model risk-based capital requirements
have favourable allocational eﬀects in comparison with constant capital
requirements. We proved that, theoretically, risk-based capital requirements
could be chosen so that they altogether eliminated the allocative distortions
which are caused by informational asymmetries in the credit market, and we
also presented a somewhat less rigorous argument for the claim that increasing
the diﬀerence in the capital requirements for diﬀerent loan categories eliminates
socially undesiderable high-risk investments.
In this section we shall use simulations for investigating the eﬀects of capital
requirements on allocative distortions. The calibrated version of our model will
be presented in subsection 4.1 below. We use this version for constrasting a
constant capital requirement regime of Basel I type with a risk-based capital
requirement regime of Basel II type, and with two modiﬁed versions of it. One
of these, to which we refer as the Adjusted Basel II regime, has been meant to
be a representation of the countercyclical elements of the Basel III reform.
We calibrate the average capital requirement over time at 8% in all
regimes.13 As we have discussed already earlier, we do not wish to consider the
eﬀect of changing the average level of capital requirements over time because
our model abstracts from considering the balance between the social costs of
bank capital on the one hand and the role of bank capital in safeguarding
banks’ solvency on the other hand. Accordingly, we do not directly consider
the impact of the increase in capital requirements that the Basel III reform
causes. However, based on our analysis of taxes as an alternative to capital
requirements in inﬂuencing credit allocation, we are able to argue for the
beneﬁcial allocational eﬀects of topping up risk-based capital requirements
with risk-based taxes on banks’ interest income.
We will compare the extent to which the considered capital requirement
regimes are able to eliminate distortions in the credit market. In the case of
e a c hr e g i m e ,w em e a s u r et h es i z eo ft h ed i s t o r t i o nb yt h ed i ﬀerence between
the expected output under the considered regime and the theoretical maximum
expected output which would obtain in the absence of all informational
asymmetries. The form of procyclicality that we consider shows up as excessive
risk-taking in booms, and we shall use diﬀerences in the output drop in the
beginning of a recession for measuring the extent to which the considered
capital requirement regimes are procyclical in our sense.
13In the calibrated version of the model both the Basel I and Basel II type capital
requirements are more than suﬃcient for covering any loan losses that could occur. In
other words, the absolute minimum capital requirements which would suﬃce for banks’
safety in our calibrated model would be much lower than the average 8% level. Nonetheless,
we wish to tie our analysis to the real world capital requirements as closely as we can and
have thus maintained the 8% average standard.
214.1 Calibration
We start by discussing the calibration of our model. Each simulation period
has been taken to represent one year so that the parameters of the model have
been calibrated at an annual level. It has been postulated that the density
of the  values among the entrepreneurs is given by the constant function
()=1 . Further, we assume that when a project of type  (where  = )
is realized in a normal period, its success probability (after the normal macro
state of the economy has become known) is given by
e ()=
½
 −  (Θ − )≤ Θ
  Θ
(4.1)
where  Θ,a n d are constants, speciﬁc to projects of type , such that
Θ  Θ. The intuition behind this deﬁnition is that Θ represents a level
of minimum competence which is required for projects of type ,a n da l lt h e
entrepreneurs with the required competence level have the same probability 
of succeeding in a project of type .T h ei n s u ﬃciently competent entrepreneurs
might also succeed, but their chances of success decrease as  decreases.
Overall, we wish to make the reservation that it is very diﬃcult to calibrate
a model which includes elements such as the entrepreneurial type aﬀecting a
project’s success. Hence, our numerical simulation results which follow should
be primarily taken as qualitative results, complementing the theoretical results
of the previous section.
Our approach is to set some parameter values by normalization, to ﬁx
some of the other quantities which characterize the equilibria of the model on
empirical grounds and to deduce the rest of the parameters from the values
thus determined. The task of calibrating the missing parameter values is made
more diﬃcult by the fact that the formulas which connect them to empirically
observable quantities contain also the capital requirements whose eﬀects we
wish to compare. In our calibration, we have taken the benchmark case, to
which the empirically observable values refer, to be a case in which the economy
is subject to a Basel I type capital requirement, and in which the state of the
e c o n o m yi sn o r m a lb o t hw h e nt h ep r o j e c t sa r el a u n c h e da n dw h e nt h e ya r e
realized. More speciﬁcally, we postulate that the values depicted in Table I,
Panel a) characterize the equilibrium in this case.Table I, Panel a) Calibrated
parameters
22Table I Panel a)
Parameter Explanation Value
 Transition probability from normal to normal state 08
 Transition probability from recession to normal state 036
 The wage from the outside option 1
e  A multiplier which characterizes the decrease in the 099
success probability of a low-risk project in recessions
e  A multiplier which characterizes the decrease in the 095
success probability of a high-risk project in recessions
 The lower cut-oﬀ entrepreneur type in the benchmark 02
case
 The higher cut-oﬀ entrepreneur type in the benchmark 06
case
e  The average success probability of low-risk projects in 0999
the benchmark case, given a normal state of the economy
e  The average success probability of high-risk projects the 098
benchmark case, given a normal state of the economy
 Proﬁt from a successful low-risk project in the 11
benchmark case
 Proﬁt from a successful high-risk project in the 125
benchmark case
 Revenue from a successful low-risk project 6
 Cost of equity (equity premium) 004
 Loss given default 045
 Success probability of a low-risk project for a competent 1
entrepreneur type in the benchmark case
 Success probability of a high-risk project for a competent 1
entrepreneur type in the benchmark case
Table I, Panel b) Calibrated parameters
Parameter Explanation Value
¯  Alternative cost (principal plus interest) 48777
of funding a project with deposits
 Revenue from a successful high-risk project 62113
Θ Parameters which characterize the success probabilities 02090
 of an entrepreneur in a low-risk and a high-risk project 99207
Θ as a function of her competence 07417
 (see formula (33)) 07965
23We have followed Repullo and Suarez (2009) in setting the transition
probabilities ’ between the two states of the economy at  =0 8 and
 =0 36. (This implies, of course, that  =1−  =0 2 and that
 =1 −  =0 64). The wage  from the outside option has been
normalized to one. We have postulated that a recession decreases the chances
of success of a high-risk project by 5% and those of a low-risk project by 1%,
so that e  =0 99 and e  =0 95.T h e v a l u e o f  indicates the borderline
between those entrepreneurs who opt for the labor market and the ones who
choose a low-risk project, and it depends on the number of agents who we
choose to include in the set of the entrepreneurs. Below we have normalized
 to 0.2. Once  has been ﬁxed,  is determined by the ratio between the
number  of low-risk and the number  of high-risk entrepreneurs in the
economy. We have set this ratio to 1, implying that in the benchmark case
 =0 6.
We wish to consider a case in which the market failure which is due to
the informational asymmetries is essentially larger in the case of high-risk
projects than in the case of low-risk projects. Accordingly, we assume that
it is essentially easier for the banks to distinguish between competent and
incompetent low-risk entrepreneurs than between competent and incompetent
high-risk entrepreneurs. In our setting, this assumption may be represented by
choosing the success probability distributions (41) so that a large majority of
the entrepreneurs are either completely competent or completely incompetent
in low-risk projects (ie either e ()=0or e ()= is valid for a large
majority of the entrepreneurs ), but in the case of high-risk projects, the share
of the entrepreneurs who belong to neither of these groups is much larger (ie
0  e ()   for a relatively large part of the entrepreneurs ). Whenever
this is the case, the average value e  of the probabilities e () must
be quite close to the maximum values of e (),i e,b u tt h ed i ﬀerence
between the average probability e  and the maximal probability 
must be essentially larger. We have introduced the simplifying assumption
that  =  =1 , ie that the competent entrepreneurs will always succeed
in a normal state of the economy, and we have assumed that e  =0 999
and e  =0 98.
The other values which we have set on empirical grounds are the proﬁts
 =1 1 and  =1 25 from successful low-risk and high-risk projects,
the revenue  =6from a low-risk project, the cost of equity  =0 04,a n d
the loss given default  =0 45. We have followed Repullo-Suarez (2009) in
our choice of , and in our simulations we have treated it as a constant. It
would be an interesting extension of the current model to make  depend on the
macro state: according to Remark 33,a ni n c r e a s eo f during recessions would
decrease the output-maximizing capital requirements in recessions, suggesting
that also the capability of the (essentially lower) actual capital requirements
to correct for allocative distortions might be increased.
After these assumptions have been introduced, it becomes possible to
deduce the values of the remaining parameters of model. They are presented
in Table I, Panel b).
244.2 Constant vs risk-based capital requirements
In the ﬁrst part of our simulations, we have contrasted a constant capital
requirement of Basel I type (ie a constant capital requirement of size  =0 08;
simply Basel I henceforth) with a risk-based capital requirement of the Basel II
type (Basel II henceforth). The latter requirement is determined in accordance


















and  =1−b  is the perceived default probability of a project of type ,w h e n
the state of the economy is .14 As it was explained above, we have calibrated
the parameter 1 which appears in (42) so that the long-run average capital
requirement turns out to be identical with the Basel I capital requirement
 =0 08.
Table II. Capital requirements under diﬀerent regimes
state: normal state: recession
low-risk high-risk average low-risk high-risk average
Basel I 0.0800 0.0800 0.0800 0.0800 0.0800 0.0800
Basel II 0.0376 0.1110 0.0734 0.0604 0.1322 0.0918
Adjusted Basel II 0.0626 0.1847 0.1213 0.0037 0.0081 0.0056
Const.max. 0.0035 0.2139 0.1015 0.0016 0.0932 0.0413
Table II shows the capital requirements that the Basel II formula and the other
considered capital requirement regimes (see subsection 4.3) produce in our
simulations. In general, the eﬀects that a capital requirement regime produces
in our model may be summarized by four numbers, because in our model the
capital requirement of a project may depend, on the one hand, the current
state of the economy (normal or recession) and on the other hand, on the
type of the project (low-risk or high-risk). In addition to these values, Table
II contains the average capital requirements for both states of the economy
under each regime. As the table shows, the Basel I type constant requirement
is always  =0 08, whereas Basel II type risk-based requirements are higher
14It should be observed that in our model the Basel II formula (42) does not have its
standard justiﬁcation, according to which capital should suﬃce for covering the loan losses
with probability 99.9%. (See eg Repullo-Suarez, 2004, p. 502.) Instead, the combination of
our model and the capital requirements of the form (42) might be viewed as a representation
of a case in which the social planner has optimized capital requirements relative to a situation
which is diﬀerent from the economic reality that the entrepreneurs and banks perceive in
our model.
25Figure 1: Output ﬂuctuations under Basel I and Basel II
for high-risk projects than for low-risk projects, and higher in recessions than
in normal times.15
In order to illustrate the behaviour of output over a business cycle in
diﬀerent capital requirement regimes, we simulated the model for eight periods
and assumed that there is a three-period recession which takes place during
the third, fourth and ﬁfth periods of the simulation. After the recession the
economy returns to the normal macro state. Figure 1 graphs the development
of output in this scenario under Basel I and Basel II capital requirements. The
ﬁgure also shows the value of output which would be obtained in the absence
of all informational asymmetries.
As Figure 1 and Table III illustrate, output under the Basel II regime is
essentially closer to its theoretical maximum than under the Basel I regime,
but the diﬀerence between the two regimes varies with the business cycle. The
central result in this paper is illustrated by the fact that the drop in output in
the beginning of the recession is larger under the Basel I regime than under the
Basel II regime: output decreases in the Basel I regime by 7.15% as opposed
to 7.04% in the Basel II regime. This results obtains because of the larger
number of high-risk projects getting ﬁnanced under Basel I.
15One may directly verify from Table II that considered capital requirements are
nevertheless on the average of the same size with the Basel I capital requirement. Given
that the state of the economy follows a Markov process, the long-run frequencies of normal
periods and recessions are ( + ) and (+ ) , respectively, and





+ (00918) ≈ 00800.
26The diﬀerence in output between the Basel I and Basel II regimes remains
on a somewhat augmented level also when the recession continues. This is
because Basel II requirements are higher in recessions than in normal times and
hence eﬀectively take the credit allocation closer to its theoretical maximum,
analyzed in subsection 3.1.16 However, the diﬀerence between Basel I and
Basel II is essentially smaller in the ﬁrst period after the recession (ie period
6), and in this period both requirements produce a larger output than the
long-run-output maximizing allocation would produce. Also these eﬀects have
simple intuitive explanations. In period 5, the entrepreneurs and the banks
base their decisions on the assumption that the recession will probably continue
in period 6, and since this does not happen in our simulations, excessively risky
strategies perform better in period 6 than in the other periods.
The diﬀerences between the capital requirements in Figure 1 can be
investigated in a more rigorous manner by calculating the long-run average
output under each considered regime. Since the output is in each period
aﬀected by the state  of the economy in the previous period (which determines
the nature of the projects that the entrepreneurs are trying to realize in the
current period) and the state  ´of the economy in the current period (which
aﬀects the success probabilities of the entrepreneurs), there are four kinds of
periods ( ´) to be considered in the calculation of the average output. If the
output that a capital requirement yields in a period of type ( ´) is denoted
by  ´ and the probability of a period of type ( ´) is denoted by  ´,t h e
average output may be deﬁned as
¯  =  +  +  +  (4.4)
The probabilities  ´ may be deduced from the assumption that the state of
the economy follows a Markov process with the transition probabilities and
. In this Markov process the long-run frequencies of normal periods and
recession periods are (+ ) and (+ ), respectively,








We let ¯ max denote the average output which would be obtained in the absence
of the market failure which is caused by informational asymmetries. When a
16More rigorously, there are three eﬀects which should be distinguished in an analysis of
the development of the output diﬀerence between Basel I and Basel II. Firstly, the increase in
the Basel II low-risk requirements in a recession tends to decrease the number of insuﬃciently
competent low-risk entrepreneurs. Secondly, if the costs from high-risk capital requirements
increase more than the costs from low-risk requirements under the Basel II regime, also the
number of the insuﬃciently competent high-risk entrepreneurs will decrease. The third eﬀect
which aﬀects the output diﬀerence is much more subtle (see also Boissay and Kok-Sørensen,
2009). The decrease in the popularity of high-risk projects tends to increase the average
success rate of the low-risk projects. This lowers the ﬁnancing cost of low-risk projects and
encourages less competent entrepreneurs to opt for the low-risk project instead of taking
the outside option. This leads to a negative eﬀect on output. However, for our parameter
speciﬁcation, in which insuﬃciently competent high-risk entrepreneurs cause much larger
allocative distortions than the insuﬃciently competent low-risk entrepreneurs, this eﬀect is
almost negligible in size.
27capital requirement regime produces the average output ¯  ,i ti sn a t u r a lt o
view the quantity ∆¯  = ¯ max − ¯  as a measure of the size of the market
failure with which the capital requirement regime is associated.
Among the capital requirement regimes that we consider, the
risk-insensitive Basel I type capital requirements correspond to the smallest
value of ¯  (which we shall denote by ¯ 1) and the largest market failure ¡
∆¯ 
¢
1 = ¯ max − ¯ 1. The risk-sensitive capital requirements are able to
decrease the market failure by making excessively risky projects less proﬁtable,
and a natural measure to the extent to which they are able to do this is given




1,t h a tt h e y
eliminate. In other words, if a capital requirement regime produces the average
output ¯  , its ability to correct for the market failure that we consider may be
measured by
 =1−
¯  − ¯ 1
¯ max − ¯ 1
=
¯ max − ¯ 
¯ max − ¯ 1
(4.6)
Table III. Correction of the market failure ()a n d
percentual output drop when recession starts
under diﬀerent capital requirement regimes
Capital Requirement  Percentual output drop
Basel I (0%) 715
Basel II 2207% 704
Adjusted Basel II 2496% 697
Const.max 4714% 684
Output maximization (100%) 625
Table III contains the values of  for Basel II as well as for the capital
requirements which are considered in the next subsection. As the table shows,
under our parameter speciﬁcation Basel II regime eliminates 22.07% of the
market failure which prevails under Basel I regime.
4.3 Modiﬁed risk-based capital requirements
I nt h ew a k eo ft h eg l o b a lﬁnancial crisis, one key element in the Basel III reform
is the additional requirement of countercyclical buﬀers. In our framework, we
can consider the eﬀect of such countercyclical features on credit allocation by
adjusting the Basel II type capital requirements in (42) so that the value
of the parameter 1 is chosen separately for recessions and for normal times.
Below we refer to capital requirements of this type as the Adjusted Basel II.
More speciﬁcally, we shall below consider Adjusted Basel II requirements which
satisfy the constraints that their 1) long-run average value remains unchanged
at  =0 08, and that they 2) are suﬃciently large to cover the losses that the
ﬁnanced projects cause for banks in recessions.
Secondly, we study the more general question to which extent allocative
distortions could be eliminated by modifying capital requirements not only
28Figure 2: Output ﬂuctuations under Basel II, adjusted Basel II, and
constrained maximization
between normal times and recessions but also by adjusting their relative
risk diﬀerentiation. In our framework, this question may be addressed by
ﬁnding the capital requirements (not necessarily of the Basel II form) which
maximize output subject to the contraints 1) and 2). We refer to these as
Constrained maximization capital requirements. Lastly, we discuss the possible
combination of capital requirements and taxes with which credit allocation
might be improved and hence the market failure might be reduced even further.
Table II presents the capital requirements under the Adjusted Basel II and
the Constained maximization regimes in which output is maximized given the
constraints 1) and 2).17 Table III contains the corresponding values of  and
the output drop under these regimes when a recession arrives. Figure 2 depicts
the development of output under these regimes and, for comparison, also under
the Basel II regime and under the theoretical output-maximizing regime.
Table III shows that the Adjusted Basel II requirements correct allocative
distortions only to a small extent. The improvement relative to Basel II is less
than 3 percentage points. This result becomes understandable when one recalls
that in our parameter speciﬁcation the problems of asymmetric information
17As we see from Table II, the resulting capital requirements are quite high in normal times
and very low in recessions. The very small values are explained by the fact that they are
determined by the condition (219), which speciﬁes the minimum amount of capital needed
for preventing bank failures. In our parameter speciﬁcation, this amount is quite small: it
turns out that (219) is valid in normal times whenever  ≥ 035% and  ≥ 175% ,a n d
in recessions whenever  ≥ 016% and  ≥ 081%.
29are mostly associated with high-risk projects. Since adjusting Basel II capital
requirements downwards in recessions does not change the allocation of capital
requirements between low-risk and high-risk projects, it does not make a large
contribution to diminishing the original market failure. This conclusion is
conﬁrmed by our results concerning the Constrained maximization capital
requirements in the following.18
In our model, the eﬀects of a capital requirement regime are summarized by
four numbers, the capital requirements for low- and high-risk projects during
normal times and recessions. As it was explained above, by Constrained
maximization we mean the choice of these four values so that output is
maximized subject to the constraints 1) and 2) above. It turns out that such
capital requirements put almost all weight on the high-risk projects and as the
value of  in Table III shows, they are able to correct almost half of the market
failure which is due to the allocative distortions.
Both the Adjusted Basel II and the Constained maximization regime lead
to a smaller percentual decrease of output in the beginning of a recession than
the Basel II regime. This is because they both reduce the number of socially
undesirable high-risk investments more eﬃciently than the Basel II regime.
The output drops by 6.97% under the Adjusted Basel II regime and by 6.84%
under the Constrained maximization regime.
As Table III suggests, considerable further beneﬁts might be obtained if
the entire market failure caused by the distorted credit allocation could be
eliminated. Relative to the Constrained maximization case, the value of  could
be increased by about another 50 percentage points and the drop of output
could be further reduced by 0.59 percentage points. Because in our simpliﬁed
model we have abstracted from trying to optimize capital requirements by
explicitly taking into account all relevant costs and beneﬁts of bank capital,
we have restricted our attention to capital requirement regimes with the same
average long-run level of capital. However, we could make the argument that
risk-based taxes on banks’ interest income, as shown in Section 3, could be
used to top up the risk-based capital requirements. If such taxes merely
redistributed existing wealth, they might be used to further improve credit
allocation. In this way, topping up the 8% average level of capital requirements
with risk-based taxes, also adjusted to the macro state, could lead to a further
reduction in the size of the market failure and hence increased average output.
18The analysis of Kashyap and Stein (2004) implies that if the cost of bank equity capital,
, goes up in a recession, capital requirements should be lowered accordingly. It can be easily
shown that a similar result is obtained in our model if  w o u l di n c r e a s ei nt h er e c e s s i o ns t a t e .
305C o n c l u s i o n s
The global ﬁnancial crisis has shown again that the seeds of a crisis may be
sown during times which on the surface appear quite normal (see also Acharya
and Naqvi, 2010). Banks may engage in excessive risk-taking which may
materialize as excessive output losses in a deep economic downturn. Clearly,
appropriate capital requirements should not contribute to the procyclicality
of lending during downturns, but at the same time they should help contain
excessive risk-taking during normal times. Accordingly, in responding to the
crisis, the international regulatory community has modiﬁed the existing capital
requirements on banks, resulting in Basel III.
In this paper we have provided a simple dynamic model for the reasons
which induce banks to take excessive risks and for the ways in which such
risks can worsen an economic downturn. We have built on the standard
framework of DeMeza and Webb (1987) in which informational asymmetries
cause overinvestment in high-risk projects, and shown that the dynamics of
project success probabilities, supported by casual empirical evidence, leads to
an excessive output drop when a recession arrives. We have studied in this
framework the role of diﬀerent types of capital requirements in alleviating such
excesses.
We found that 1) risk-based capital requirements are better than constant
capital requirements in reducing overinvestment and alleviating the output loss
in recession, and that 2) adjusting risk-based capital requirements downward
in recessions and increasing the risk-diﬀerentiation of risk-weights are both
beneﬁcial, but the latter adjustment appears more important. We also provide
a new rationale for adjusting capital requirements downward in recessions,
which relates to the ways in which the allocational distortion in bank credit
markets varies in macro states.
Our model has been simpliﬁed in the sense that we have not directly
considered the eﬀect of the average level of capital requirements on credit
allocation; rather, we have compared diﬀerent capital requirement regimes with
the same long-run average level of capital. Nonetheless, our results suggest
that also the level of capital requirements and not only their degree of risk
diﬀerentiation could have quite signiﬁcant allocational implications. Hence,
a natural avenue for future research would be to extend the current analysis
to study the optimal level of capital requirements (see eg the discussion in
Hellwig, 2010).
31References
Acharya, V V — Cooley, T F — Richardson, M P — Walter, I (2010)
Manufacturing tail risk: A perspective on the ﬁnancial crisis of
2007—2009. Foundations and Trends in Finance, Vol. 4.
Acharya, V V — Naqvi, H (2010) The seeds of a crisis: A theory of
bank liquidity and risk-taking over the business cycle. March 21, 2010,
available at http://ssrn.com.
A g u r ,I—D e m e r t z i s ,M( 2 0 1 0 )Monetary policy and excessive bank risk
taking. European Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2010-06S.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards:
A Revised Framework — A Comprehensive Version (Bank for
International Settlements, June 2006).
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) Group of Governors and
Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital
standards. 12 September 2010. www.bis.org.
Boissay, F — Kok-Sørensen, C (2009) The stabilizing eﬀects of
risk-sensitive bank capital. Unpublished working paper, European Central
Bank.
Chiesa, G (2001) Incentive-based Lending Capacity, Competition and
Regulation in Banking. Journal of Financial Intermediation 10, 28—53.
De Meza, D — Webb, D (1987) Too much investment: A problem of
asymmetric information. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 281—292.
Furﬁne, C (2001) Bank Portfolio Allocation: The Impact of Capital
Requirements, Regulatory Monitoring, and Economic Conditions.
Journal of Financial Services Research 20, 33—56.
Gordy, M B — Howells, B (2006) Procyclicality in Basel II: Can We
Treat the Disease without Killing the Patient? Journal of Financial
Intermediation 15, 395—417.
Heid, F (2007) The cyclical eﬀects of the Basel II capital requirements.
Journal of Banking & Finance 31, 3885—3900.
Hellwig, M (2010) Capital regulation after the crisis: Business as usual?
Preprints fo the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
2010/31.
Kashyap, A K — Stein, J C (2004) Cyclical Implications of the Basel II
Capital Standards. Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
1, 18—31.
Nickell, P — Perraudin, W — Varotto, S (2000) Stability of rating
transitions. Journal of Banking and Finance 24, 203—227.
32Pennacchi, G G (2005) Risk-based capital standards, deposit insurance,
and procyclicality. Journal of Financial Intermediation 14, 423—465.
Repullo, R (2004) Capital requirements, market power, and
risk-taking. Journal of Financial Intermediation 13, 156—182.
Repullo, R — Saurina, J — Trucharte, C (2009) Mitigating the procyclicality
of Basel II. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7382.
Repullo, R — Suarez, J (2004) Loan pricing under Basel capital
requirements. Journal of Financial Intermediation 13, 496—521.
Repullo, R — Suarez, J (2009) The procyclical eﬀects of bank capital
regulation. European Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2010-05S.
Rochet, J.-C (1992) Capital requirements and the behaviour of
commercial banks. European Economic Review 36, 1137—1178.
Stiglitz, J — Weiss, A (1981) Credit rationing in markets with imperfect
information. American Economic Review 71, 393—410.
Thakor, A V (1996) Capital requirements, monetary policy, and
aggregate bank lending: Theory and empirical evidence. Journal of
Finance 51, 279—324.
Zhu, H (2008) Capital regulation and banks’ ﬁnancial decisions.
International Journal of Central Banking, March, 165—211.
Zicchino, L (2006) A model of bank capital, lending and the
macroeconomy: Basel I versus Basel II. The Manchester School,
Supplement 2006, 50—77.
33 
BANK OF FINLAND RESEARCH 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
ISSN 0785-3572, print; ISSN 1456-6184, online 
 
1/2010  Timo Korkeamäki – Elina Rainio – Tuomas Takalo  Law and stock markets: 
evidence from an emerging market. 2010. 34 p. ISBN 978-952-462-568-5, 
print; ISBN 978-952-462-569-2, online. 
 
2/2010  Iftekhar Hasan – Heiko Schmiedel – Liang Song  Growth strategies and value 
creation: what works best for stock exchanges? 2010. 48 p.  
  ISBN 978-952-462-570-8, print; ISBN 978-952-462-571-5, online. 
 
3/2010  Iftekhar Hasan – Heiko Schmiedel – Liang Song  Return from retail banking 
and payments. 2010. 53 p. ISBN 978-952-462-572-2, print;  
 ISBN  978-952-462-573-9,  online. 
 
4/2010  Sungho Choi – Bill B Francis – Iftekhar Hasan  Cross-border bank M&As 
and risk: evidence from the bond market. 2010. 47 p.  
  ISBN 978-952-462-574-6, print; ISBN 978-952-462-575-3, online. 
 
5/2010  Hanna Freystätter  Financial market disturbances as sources of business 
cycle fluctuations in Finland. 2010. 46 p. ISBN 978-952-462-576-0, print; 
ISBN 978-952-462-577-7, online. 
 
6/2010  Patrick M Crowley  Long cycles in growth: explorations using new 
frequency domain techniques with US data. 2010. 49 p. 
  ISBN 978-952-462-586-9, print; ISBN 978-952-462-587-6, online. 
 
7/2010  Paavo Miettinen  Information acquisition during a Dutch auction. 2010. 
30 p. ISBN 978-952-462-588-3, print; ISBN 978-952-462-589-0, online. 
 
8/2010  Syed Mujahid Hussain  Simultaneous monetary policy announcements and 
international stock markets response: an intraday analysis. 2010. 32 p. 
ISBN 978-952-462-590-6, print; ISBN 978-952-462-591-3, online. 
 
9/2010  Antti J Tanskanen – Petri Niininen – Kari Vatanen  Risk-based classification 
of financial instruments in the Finnish statutory pension scheme TyEL. 
2010. 35 p. ISBN 978-952-462-592-0, print; ISBN 978-952-462-593-7, online. 
 
10/2010  Hanna Putkuri  Housing loan rate margins in Finland. 2010. 39 p.  
  ISBN 978-952-462-594-4, print; ISBN 978-952-462-595-1, online. 
 
11/2010  Efrem Castelnuovo – Salvatore Nisticò  Stock market conditions and 
monetary policy in a DSGE model for the US.2010. 62 p. 
  ISBN 978-952-462-596-8, print; ISBN 978-952-462-597-5, online. 
 
12/2010  Juha Kilponen – Torsten Santavirta  New evidence on implicit contracts from 
linked employer-employee data. 2010. 25 p. ISBN 978-952-462-600-2, print; 
ISBN 978-952-462-601-9, online. 
 
13/2010  George W Evans – Seppo Honkapohja – Kaushik Mitra  Does Ricardian 
Equivalence hold when expectations are not rational? 2010. 26 p.  
  ISBN 978-952-462-602-6, print; ISBN 978-952-462-603-3, online. 
  
 
14/2010  Karlo Kauko  The feasibility of through-the-cycle ratings. 2010. 32 p.  
  ISBN 978-952-462-605-7, online. 
 
15/2010  Risto Herrala  Credit constraints and durable consumption. A new 
empirical approach. 2010. 19 p.  
 ISBN  978-952-462-615-6,  online. 
 
16/2010  Patrick M Crowley – Aaron Schultz  A new approach to analyzing 
convergence and synchronicity in growth and business cycles: cross 
recurrence plots and quantification analysis. 2010. 53 p.  
  ISBN 978-952-462-617-0, online. 
 
17/2010  Esa Jokivuolle – Ilkka Kiema – Timo Vesala  Credit allocation, capital 
requirements and output. 2010. 35 p. 
ISBN 978-952-462-619-4, online. Suomen Pankki
Bank of Finland
P.O.Box 160
FI-00101 HELSINKI
Finland